Abstract-Load-serving entities which procure electricity from the wholesale electricity market to service end-users face significant quantity and price risks due to the volatile nature of electricity demand and quasi-fixed residential tariffs at which electricity is sold. This paper investigates strategies for load serving entities to hedge against such price risks. Specifically, we compute profit-maximizing portfolios of forward contract and call options as a function of uncertain aggregate user demand and wholesale electricity prices. We compare the profit to the case of Demand Response, where users are offered monetary incentives to temporarily reduce their consumption during periods of supply shortages. Using smart meter data of residential customers in California, we simulate optimal portfolios and derive conditions under which Demand Response outperforms call options and forward contracts. Our analysis suggests that Demand Response becomes more competitive as wholesale electricity prices increase.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, electricity was supplied by vertically integrated entities which maintained full functional control over the entire supply chain, including generation, transmission, and distribution assets. This static structure constituted an impediment for new energy providers on both the supply and retail end to participate in the energy market. In the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued Orders 888 and 889 in April 1996 to remove such barriers of entry in an attempt to promote competition and market efficiency [1] . The result of this market design process was a combination of a central electricity pool operating dayahead, overseen by Independent System Operators (ISOs), and bilateral trading between generating companies and electric utilities, supplanting traditional vertical entities.
Consequently, generators and utilities started facing price and quantity risks ensuing from the inelasticity of user demand, the steep supply curve due to the slowly changing nature of power plants' output adjustment, and prohibitive cost of energy storage. These factors allow small increases (decreases) of demand to result in a price boom (bust). Furthermore, despite persistent recommendations of the economic consensus for passing along varying electricity prices to end-users to increase economic efficiency [2] , policymakers have retained quasi-fixed electricity tariffs, e.g. Time-ofUse pricing. In conjunction with the obligation of utilities to This market situation has resulted in several crises, e.g. in California (2000) , Texas (2004) , and the Midwestern United States (1998). As a reaction, firstly, electric utilities and generating companies started to hedge against price fluctuations through contracts on different scales of time, thereby locking in a fixed price and quantity to be delivered over a contractually specified period of time. Secondly, Demand-Side Management (DSM), which aims to affect consumer behavior during periods of peak demand, emerged as a viable tool to partially relay price risks to end-users. For instance, companies like OPOWER provide Demand Response (DR) services to utilities, allowing them to offer monetary rewards to end-users in exchange for a reduction in electricity consumption during hours of peak demand [3] .
A large body of research, particularly in operations research, has studied optimal hedging contracts, most often from the utility perspective, including [4] , [5] , where the authors construct an optimal one-step hedging portfolio with standard power options, or [6] , which finds an optimal energy procurement policy with stochastic programming over a specified period. [7] analyzes hedging instruments against price volatility for industrial customers. [8] investigates hedging strategies for electricity generators.
While there exists a copious amount of literature on operational and algorithmic aspects of DR (e.g. load scheduling and shifting [9] , [10] , [11] ), few researchers have focused on the role of DR as an alternative way of hedging. Notable exceptions are [12] , where the authors discuss interruptible service contracts, and [13] , which estimates the economic value of DR programs for commerical customers by adapting models for energy options. To the best of our knowledge, no significant research has investigated the option value of residential DR programs. To close this gap, we derive a stylized model for the utility's profit under such DR schemes and determine its optimum. The methodology we use is closest in spirit with [14] , which determines the optimal bidding volume of wind generators in a conventional energy market. We compare the profit under DR to the case of forward contracts and call options by incorporating the conditional value at risk [15] measure. Using smart meter data of residential customers in California, we find that DR can yield higher expected profits than under forward contracts and call options, especially in the presence of high wholesale electricity prices. Due to space constraints, all proofs are relegated to the full version of this paper [16] . Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between generating companies, load-serving entities (utilities), the wholesale electricity market, and end-users of electricity.
II. MARKET PARTICIPANTS
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End Users The electric utility can strike one-to-one contracts with generating companies to purchase a fixed amount of electricityq at a locked-in priceλ to be delivered at some apriori specified time in the future. P denotes the premium for each reserved unit of electricity. The utility provides endusers with electricity at a fixed unit rate λ f and is obligated to cover the random demand d at all times. The rate λ f is exogenously set by the Public Utilities Commission. However, the utility can use DR to incentivize users to temporarily reduce their demand. This is achieved by offering the reward r to end-users, which elicits a demand reduction h(r). If the demand d exceedsq, i.e. the purchased amount of electricity through one-to-one contracts with generators, the utility has to procure [d −q] + units of electricity from the wholesale market at uncertain wholesale price λ s per unit. The market clearing price λ s , reflected by Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), is a random variable and depends on the ratio of energy supply by generators, the total demand [d −q] + , operational constraints, as well as congestion of the grid.
The interactions between generators and the utility as well as between end-users and the utility are instruments to hedge utilities against high prices λ s . If the utility expects high wholesale prices λ s , then it has an incentive to reduce customer demand d by engaging in DR, or to procure cheaper electricity through contracts with generating companies. We make the following assumptions: Assumption 1. The utility is risk-neutral.
Assumption 2. The utility is price-taking.
Assumption 2 is a natural assumption, stating that the utility cannot influence prices by exerting market power. Together with Assumption 1, the question we seek to answer in the remainder of this paper is how the utility maximizes its expected profit in the presence of the random variables d and λ s and hedging instruments. For simplicity, we focus on a single load zone to avoid spatial heterogeneity of LMPs. 
A. Base Case (No Hedging)
If the LSE does not buy any options at stage 0, its expected profit at time 1 is simply
We will compare the profit of this base case to the forward contract, call option, and DR in the following.
B. Forward Contract
A forward contract is a one-on-one agreement between the LSE and an electricity generator, which obligates the generator (at time 0) to deliver a fixed amount of electricitȳ q at a locked-in priceλ F to the LSE at some point in the future (time 1). Forward contracts possess high flexibility and are traded as over-the-counter products. The LSE seeks to sign such a contract if it has reason to believe the expected wholesale price at the time of delivery to exceedλ F , and the generator will do so in the opposite case. If, at time 1,q > d, the LSE has purchased too much volume at time 0, and sō q − d are wasted. Conversely, ifq < d at time 1, d −q units of electricity have to be bought at real-time spot price λ s .
The profit Π F under a forward contract of volumeq at unit priceλ is therefore expressed as 
C. Call Option
Similar to fixed forward contracts, the LSE can strike oneon-one deals with a counterparty over an agreed volumeq at strike priceλ C . The key difference is that the LSE can, but is not obliged to, exercise the call option ifλ C < λ s at time 1. Typically the buyer of the call option pays a premium P for each unit of the call option.
The profit Π C under a call option with volumeq at strike priceλ C at the premium P per unit can thus be written as
The last term of (4) encodes the fact that the LSE can cover up toq units at the cheaper of the strike priceλ C or the wholesale price λ s . The remainder [d −q] + has to be purchased from the spot market at price λ s .
G(y)dy, the profit-maximizing call volumeq * and the corresponding optimal expected profit
E[Π * C ] arē q * = F −1 1 − P E[λ S ] −λ C + λ C 0 G(y)dy , (5a) E[Π * C ] = λ f −λ + λ C 0 G(y)dy E[d] (5b) − E[λ s ] −λ C + λ C 0 G(y)dy ∞ q * xf (x)dx.
D. Demand Response
We model the effect of DR as a shift of the consumption distribution towards zero, induced by the monetary reward r ∈ R + received from the LSE. Note that the real reduction of the consumer in response to the DR signal has to be estimated by constructing the counterfactual consumption in the absence of the DR signal, which is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to [17] , [18] .
Let f (d) denote the PDF of d in the absence of any reward with support [d min , d max ]. Let F (d|r) denote the cumulative distribution function of the random variable d, given the reward level r. Then the distribution shift is modeled as
where h(r) is a concave, increasing function representing the elasticity of the user in response to reward r, i.e. the relative reduction of consumption as a function of r.
h(r) is equivalent to the shift of the location parameter of distribution f (·). We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3. The reward r ≥ 0 induces a linear shift, i.e.
With Assumption 3 and the definition of the distribution shift, it becomes clear that the distribution f (·|r), given a reward r > 0, has support
Assumption 3 is necessary for analytical tractability of the DR hedging case. Certainly, the linearity of h(r) is unrealistic, since it implies that for large enough reward levels r, the user consumes zero with probability 1. However, for small r, a linear elasticity h(r) can be justified.
The LSE's profit Π DR with Demand Response is
From (8) 
for the optimal reward means that the ability to shift, 1/α, must be greater than the inverse of the expected price difference (E[λ s ] − λ f ) −1 to make DR profitable. The higher the expected price difference E[λ s ] − λ f , the less stringent the requirement on α, which agrees with intuition. Depending on the properties of the demand distribution F (·), a mixed portfolio of call and forward contract options can exist, but is impossible to obtain in closed form for general distributions. This is consistent with the approach in [4] where the authors replicate the optimal portfolio (which would be continuous) with a finite set of options. Due to Theorem 4, we restrict our attention to optimal portfolios consisting of a unique option in the remainder of this paper.
Theorem 4 (Diversified Portfolios
IV. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY
For a better understanding of the optimal profits under the different contracts Π * F , Π * C , Π * DR introduced in the previous section, we relate these quantities to properties of the consumption distribution F (·).
A. Influence of Distribution Tail
By incorporating the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure [15] , we can relate the optimal profits to the tail properties of the consumption density f (·). The CVaR at confidence level α ∈ (0, 1) of a random variable X with CDF F (·) representing loss is formally defined as
and can be interpreted as the expected loss attained in the worst (1 − α) · 100% of cases or the expectation of the (1−α) probability tail of X. 
where we used the definitions
From Proposition 1, it follows that the optimal profit decreases as the conditional expectation of the tail increases, that is, the more heavy-tailed the consumption distribution f (·) becomes. It is illuminating to analyze the optimal decisions and corresponding optimal expected profits for perfect information of d, which are given in the following:
C |d denote the optimal forward contract and call volume, respectively. r * |d signifies the optimal DR reward.
B. Influence of Statistical Dispersion
In this section, we relate the statistical dispersion of the consumption distribution F (·) to the optimal expected profit. Intuitively, the more spread out the distribution F (·), the lower the expected profit. While many measures for statistical dispersion exist in the literature, such as interquartile ranges, absolute deviation, variance-to-mean-ratio, etc., we express the optimal expected profits E[Π 
−1 are expressed as follows:
For the case of perfect information, i.e. σ = 0 and d min = d max = d, the equations for the optimal expected profit under perfect information (13a)-(13c) are recovered. Equations (14a)-(14c) explain that the optimal expected profit for each case decreases linearly in σ, giving rise to the notion that more "spread out" distributions diminish the expected profit. The rate of decrease depends on case-specific parameters, whose relation to each other determines which hedging option is profit-maximizing for a particular case. As consumption distributions typically are plagued by a large amount of uncertainty (large σ), improved load predictions to decrease σ have a direct economic benefit to the utility.
V. CHOOSING THE BEST OPTION
We now derive conditions on the random variables λ s and d with distributions G(·) and F (·) and the option parameters λ F ,λ C , P , and α announced at time 0 to determine the best hedging strategy consisting of a unique option. For analytical tractability, we make the following assumptions: 
. (15) DR is preferred over the forward contract, if
Finally, DR is preferred over the call option, if
with
and whereλ F and λ C denote the unit price for each reserved unit of electricity under the forward contract and the call option, respectively.
VI. SIMULATIONS
Assumptions 4 and 5 admit a closed form solution to the best hedging instrument, stated in (15)- (17) . For a more elaborate analysis, we now repeat this exercise by approximating the demand distribution F (·) as well as the distribution of spot prices G(·) with real data from California to approximate decision boundaries for which the expected profits under different hedging instruments are identical. Since closed-form solution under this more realistic scenario do not exist, we plot these optimal decision boundaries as a function of the hedging parameters P,λ F ,λ C , and α.
A. Empirical Distribution of Demand
We use hourly smart meter data from residential customers in California to create a demand distribution for different sizes of user aggregations. The observations are restricted to hourly consumptions between 4-5 pm and 5-6 pm. Figure 3 shows the empirical PDFs and CDFs for different sizes of user aggregations. We approximate both functions as follows:
With the constraintsF (d min ) = 0 andF (d max ) = 1, a and γ are determined as a function of the decay parameter c. 
B. Empirical Distribution of Wholesale Prices
To obtain the price distribution G(·), we convert 5-minute locational marginal prices (LMPs) λ s set by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) into an hourly format. The distribution G(·) of "high" LMPs is obtained by fitting a density function to the normalized histogram of those LMPs for which the two previous LMPs exceed the threshold ξ > 0, i.e. we consider all {λ s |λ s,t−1 ≥ ξ, λ s,t−2 ≥ ξ} for different thresholds ξ. We approximate the density function with a log-normal distribution:
which has support [0, ∞), that is, we disregard negative LMPs. Figure 4 shows the actual observed data and the approximation for ξ = 80 USD/MWh. 
C. Pairwise Comparison of Hedging Instruments
We now compute decision boundaries of equal expected profit for all 3 pairs of hedging instruments with Newton's method, using the demand and price distributions approximated in (18a), (18b), and (19).
1) DR vs. Forward Contract: Figure 5 shows the decision boundary of elasticity α above which the optimal expected profits under DR is greater than under the forward contract, that is, wholesale price E[λ s ] increase. The negative correlation of α withλ F is consistent with expectations as a higherλ F makes forward contracts more expensive. The fact that decreasing wholesale prices E[λ s ] make DR more competitive than forward contracts can be explained by comparing (3b) to (9b), which states that the entire demand d has to be covered at price λ s in the DR case, compared to only [d −q] + in the forward contract case. Also shown in Figure 5 is the lower bound on α (gray transparent surface) below which DR is non-profitable, i.e.
, where we set the residential tariff to λ f = 0.05 USD/kWh.
2) DR vs. Call: Figure 6 shows the decision boundary of α for different call strike prices λ C and premium levels P above which E[Π DR ] ≥ E[Π C ] with ξ = 80. As the premium and strike price for the call option increase (and hence the call option becomes less attractive), DR becomes more profitable because α decreases. 3) Forward Contract vs. Call: Lastly, Figure 7 shows the decision surface forλ F as a function of the call option parameters P andλ C above which the forward contract is more profitable in expectation, i.e.
As expected, the forward contract becomes more attractive as either the premium P or the call strike priceλ C increase. 
D. Evaluation
Assuming a residential tariff of 0.05 USD kWh , a lower bound on the elasticity α of approximately 0.02 MWh USD = 20 kWh USD at first glance seems to be an unachievable goal. However, note that wholesale prices can spike at up to 1000 USD MWh , which is far outside the range of our calculations. Further, we disregarded transmission losses and capacity costs inherent to generators and utilities, which make the delivery of electricity under the forward contract and the call option more expensive, thereby lowering the bound on α.
VII. CONCLUSION
We analyzed hedging instruments for load-serving entities to mitigate price risks stemming from volatile energy supply and demand. This is motivated by the obligation of loadserving entities to meet the energy demand of customers under contract instantaneously, for which -in the absence of any hedging instruments -electricity has to be procured in its entirety from the wholesale electricity market (at potentially high prices). Forward contracts and call options between load-serving entities and generating companies as well as Demand Response programs for end-users are methods to share this risk between market participants. We formulated the optimal hedging strategy as a profit maximization problem which is random in the aggregate demand and wholesale price. The optimal expected profit under each hedging instrument was found to be monotonically decreasing in the statistical dispersion of the demand distribution (linearly decreasing for uniform distributions). Using consumption and price data in California, we compared the optimal expected profits between the hedging methods in a pairwise fashion to generate decision boundaries of equal profit.
Our results can be extended in several directions. Firstly, a more involved analysis would respect operational constraints of the smart grid, e.g. transmission capacities and grid congestion. Secondly, analyzing how the optimal expected profit increases as a function of diminished uncertainty in wholesale prices and consumer demand due to forecasting is worthwhile from the profit maximization perspective. Lastly, forgoing Assumptions 1 and 2 allows utilities and generating companies to exercise market power. This calls for a gametheoretic formulation from the perspective of both generating companies and utilities, where each player seeks bids from one another in a mechanism design framework.
